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Abstract—This work investigates three aspects: (a) a network
vulnerability as the non-uniform vulnerable-host distribution, (b)
threats, i.e., intelligent malwares that exploit such a vulnerability,
and (c) defense, i.e., challenges for fighting the threats. We
first study five large data sets and observe consistent clustered
vulnerable-host distributions. We then present a new metric,
referred to as the non-uniformity factor, which quantifies the
unevenness of a vulnerable-host distribution. This metric is
essentially the Renyi information entropy and better charac-
terizes the non-uniformity of a distribution than the Shannon
entropy. Next, we analyze the propagation speed of network-
aware malwares in view of information theory. In particular, we
draw a relationship between Renyi entropies and randomized
epidemic malware-scanning algorithms. We find that the infection
rates of malware-scanning methods are characterized by the
Renyi entropies that relate to the information bits in a non-
unform vulnerable-host distribution extracted by a randomized
scanning algorithm. Meanwhile, we show that a representative
network-aware malware can increase the spreading speed by
exactly or nearly a non-uniformity factor when compared to
a random-scanning malware at an early stage of malware
propagation. This quantifies that how much more rapidly the
Internet can be infected at the early stage when a malware
exploits an uneven vulnerable-host distribution as a network-
wide vulnerability. Furthermore, we analyze the effectiveness of
defense strategies on the spread of network-aware malwares. Our
results demonstrate that counteracting network-aware malwares
is a significant challenge for the strategies that include host-based
defense and IPv6.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware attacks are a significant threat to networks. Mal-
wares are malicious softwares that include worms, viruses,
bots, and spywares. A fundamental characteristic of malwares
is self-propagation, i.e., a malware can infect vulnerable hosts
and use infected hosts to self-disseminate. A key component
of malware propagation is malware-scanning methods, i.e.,
how effectively and efficiently the malware finds vulnerable
targets. Most of the real, especially old worms, such as
Code Red [16], Slammer [17], and latter Witty [24], exploit
naive random scanning. Random scanning chooses target
IP addresses uniformly and does not take any information
on network structures into consideration. Advanced scanning
methods, however, have been developed that exploit the IP
address structure. For example, Code Red II and Nimda worms
have used localized scanning [34], [35]. Localized scanning
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preferentially searches for vulnerable hosts in the local sub-
network. The Blaster worm has used sequential scanning
in addition to localized scanning [37]. Sequential scanning
searches for vulnerable hosts through their closeness in the
IP address space. The AgoBot has employed a blacklist of the
well-known monitored IP address space and avoided scanning
these addresses to be stealthy [20]. A common characteristic of
these malwares is that they scan for vulnerable hosts by taking
a certain structure in the IP address space into consideration.
Such a structure, as we shall soon show, exhibits network
vulnerabilities to defenders and advantages to attackers.
In this paper, we study the perspective of attackers who
attempt to collect the information on network vulnerabilities
and design intelligent malwares. By studying this perspective,
we hope to help defenders better understand and defend
against malware propagation. For attackers, an open question
is how certain information can help them design fast-spreading
malwares. The information may include the vulnerability on
end hosts, the number of vulnerable hosts, the locations of
detection systems, and the distributions of vulnerable hosts.
This work focuses on vulnerable-host distributions. The
vulnerable-host distributions have been observed to be bursty
and spatially inhomogeneous by Barford et al. [2]. A non-
uniform distribution of Witty-worm victims has been reported
by Rajab et al. [19]. A Web-server distribution has been
found to be non-uniform in the IP address space in our
prior work [8]. These discoveries suggest that vulnerable hosts
and Web servers may be “clustered” (i.e., non-uniform). The
clustering/non-uniformity makes the network vulnerable since
if one host is compromised in a cluster, the rest may be
compromised rather quickly. Therefore, the information on
vulnerable-host distributions can be critical for attackers to
develop intelligent malwares.
We refer the malwares that exploit the information on highly
uneven distributions of vulnerable hosts as network-aware
malwares. Such malwares include aforementioned localized-
scanning and sequential-scanning malwares. In our prior work,
we have studied importance-scanning malwares [8], [7], [14].
Specifically, importance scanning provides a “what-if” sce-
nario: When there are many ways for network-aware malwares
to exploit the information on vulnerable hosts, importance
scanning is a worst-case threat-model and can serve as a
benchmark for studying real network-aware malwares. What
has been observed is that real network-aware and importance-
scanning malwares spread much faster than random-scanning
malwares [19], [8]. This shows the importance of the problem.
It is not well understood, however, how to characterize the
relationship between the information on vulnerable-host distri-
2butions and the propagation speed of network-aware malwares.
Questions arise. Does there exist a generic characteris-
tic across different vulnerable-host distributions? If so, how
do network-aware malwares exploit such a vulnerability?
How can we defend against such malwares? Our goal is to
investigate such a generic characteristic in vulnerable-host
distributions, to quantify its relationship with network-aware
malwares, and to understand the effectiveness of defense
strategies. To achieve this goal, we investigate network-aware
malware attacks in view of information theory, focusing on
both the worst-case and real network-aware malwares.
A fundamental concept of information theory is the entropy
that measures the uncertainty of outcomes of a random event.
The reduction of uncertainty is measured by the amount of ac-
quired information. We apply the Renyi entropy, a generalized
entropy [21], to analyze the uncertainty of finding vulnerable
hosts for different malware-scanning methods. This would
relate malware-attacking methods with the information bits
extracted by malwares from the vulnerable-host distribution.
As the first step, we study, from five large-scale mea-
surement sets, the common characteristics of non-uniform
vulnerable-host distributions. Then, we derive a new metric as
the non-uniformity factor to characterize the non-uniformity
of a vulnerable-host distribution. A larger non-uniformity
factor reflects a more non-uniform distribution of vulnerable
hosts. We obtain the non-uniformity factors from the data
sets on vulnerable-host distributions and show that all data
sets have large non-uniformity factors. Moreover, the non-
uniformity factor is a function of the Renyi entropies of order
two and zero [21]. We show that the non-uniformity factor
better characterizes the unevenness of a distribution than the
Shannon entropy. Therefore, in view of information theory, the
non-uniformity factor provides a quantitative measure of the
unevenness/uncertainty of a vulnerable-host distribution.
Next, we relate the generalized entropy with network-aware
scanning methods. The class of network-aware malwares that
we study all utilizes randomized epidemic algorithms. Hence
the importance of applying the generalized entropy is that the
Renyi entropy characterizes the bits of information extractable
by the randomized epidemic algorithms. Specifically, we ex-
plicitly relate the Renyi entropy with the randomized epidemic
scanning methods through analyzing the spreading speed of
network-aware malwares at an early stage of propagation. A
malware that spreads faster at the early stage can in general
infect most of the vulnerable hosts in a shorter time. The prop-
agation ability of a malware at the early stage is characterized
by the infection rate [32]. We derive the infection rates of a
class of network-aware malwares. We find that the infection
rates of random-scanning and network-aware malwares are
determined by the uncertainty of the vulnerable-host distri-
bution or the Renyi entropies of different orders. Specifically,
a random-scanning malware has the largest uncertainty (e.g.,
Renyi entropy of order zero), and an optimal importance-
scanning malware has the smallest uncertainty (e.g., Renyi
entropy with order infinity). Moreover, the infection rates
of some real network-aware malwares depend on the non-
uniformity factors or the Renyi entropy of order two. For
example, compared with random scanning, localized scanning
can increase the infection rate by nearly a non-uniformity
factor. Therefore, the infection rates of malware-scanning
algorithms are characterized by the Renyi entropies, relating
the efficiency of a randomized scanning algorithm with the un-
certainty on a non-uniform vulnerable-host distribution. These
analytical results on the relationships between vulnerable-host
distributions and network-aware malware spreading ability are
validated by simulation.
Finally, we study new challenges to malware defense posed
by network-aware malwares. Using the non-uniformity factor,
we show quantitatively that the host-based defense strategies,
such as proactive protection [4] and virus throttling [27],
should be deployed at almost all hosts to slow down network-
aware malwares at the early stage. A partial deployment
would nearly invalidate such host-based defense. Moreover,
we demonstrate that the infection rate of a network-aware
malware in the IPv6 Internet can be comparable to that of the
Code Red v2 worm in the IPv4 Internet. Therefore, fighting
network-aware malwares is a real challenge.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II introduces information theory and malware propagation.
Section III presents our collected data sets. Section IV for-
mulates the problems studied in this work. Section V in-
troduces a new metric called the non-uniformity factor and
compares this metric to the Shannon entropy. Sections VI
and VII characterize the spreading ability of network-aware
malwares through theoretical analysis and simulation. Section
VIII further studies the effectiveness of defense strategies on
network-aware malwares. Section IX concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we provide the background on information
theory and malware propagation.
A. Renyi Entropy and Information Theory
An entropy is a measure of the average information uncer-
tainty of a random variable [11]. A general entropy, called the
Renyi entropy [21], [5], is defined as
Hq(X) =
1
1− q
log2
∑
x∈X
(PX(x))
q
, for q 6= 1, (1)
where the random variable X is with probability distribution
PX and alphabet X . The well-known Shannon entropy is a
special case of the Renyi entropy, i.e.,
H(X) = lim
q→1
Hq(X). (2)
It is noted that
H0(X) = log2 |X | (3)
where |X | is the alphabet size, and
H∞(X) = − log2max
x∈X
PX(x) (4)
where H∞(X) is a result from limq→∞Hq(X) and is called
the min-entropy of X . In this paper, moreover, we are also
interested in the Renyi entropy of order two, i.e.,
H2(X) = − log2
∑
x∈X
(PX(x))
2. (5)
3Comparing H0(X), H(X), H2(X), and H∞(X), we have the
following theorem that has been proved in [22], [5].
Theorem 1:
H0(X) ≥ H(X) ≥ H2(X) ≥ H∞(X) (6)
with equality if and only if X is uniformly distributed over
X .
Information theory has been applied in a wide range of
fields, such as communication theory, Kolmogorov complex-
ity, and cryptography. A fundamental result of information
theory is that data compression can be achieved by assigning
short codewords to the most frequent outcomes of the data
source and necessarily longer codewords to the less frequent
outcomes [11].
B. Malware Propagation
Similar to data compression, a smart malware that searches
for vulnerable hosts can assign more scans to a range of
IP addresses that contain more vulnerable hosts. Thus, the
malware can reduce the number of scans for attacking a large
number of vulnerable hosts. We call such a malware as a
network-aware malware. In essence, network-aware malwares
consider the network structure (i.e., an uneven distribution of
vulnerable hosts) to speed up the propagation.
Many network-aware malwares have been studied. For
example, routable-scanning malwares select targets only in
the routable address space, using the information provided
by the BGP routing table [29], [32]. Evasive worms exploit
lightweight sampling to obtain the knowledge of live subnets
of the address space and spread only in these networks [20].
In our prior work, we have studied a class of worst-case mal-
wares, called importance-scanning malwares, which exploit
non-uniform vulnerable-host distributions in an optimal fash-
ion [8], [7]. Importance scanning is developed from and named
after importance sampling in statistics. Importance scanning
probes the Internet according to an underlying vulnerable-host
distribution. Such a scanning method forces malware scans
on the most relevant parts of an address space and supplies
an optimal scanning strategy. Furthermore, if the complete
information of vulnerable hosts is known, an importance-
scanning malware can achieve the top speed of infection and
become flash worms [26].
III. MEASUREMENTS AND VULNERABLE-HOST
DISTRIBUTIONS
We begin our study by considering how significant the un-
evenness of vulnerable-host distributions is. We use five large
data sets to obtain empirical vulnerable-host distributions.
A. Measurements
DShield (D1): DShield collects intrusion detection system
(IDS) logs [36]. Specifically, DShield provides the information
of vulnerable hosts by aggregating logs from more than 1,600
IDSes distributed throughout the Internet. We further focus on
the following ports that were attacked by worms: 80 (HTTP),
135 (DCE/RPC), 445 (NetBIOS/SMB), 1023 (FTP servers and
the remote shell attacked by W32.Sasser.E.Worm), and 6129
(DameWare).
iSinks (P1 and C1): Two unused address space monitors
run the iSink system [30]. The monitors record the unwanted
traffic arriving at the unused address spaces that include a
Class A network (referred to as “Provider” or P1) and two
Class B networks at the campus of the University of Wisconsin
(referred to as “Campus” or C1) [2].
Witty-worm victims (W1): A list of Witty-worm victims is
provided by CAIDA [24]. CAIDA used a network telescope
with approximate 224 IP addresses to log the traffic of Witty-
worm victims that are Internet security systems (ISS) products.
Web-server list (W2): The IP addresses of Web servers were
collected through UROULETTE (http://www.uroulette.com/).
UROULETTE provides a random uniform resource locator
(URL) generator to obtain a list of IP addresses of Web servers.
The first three data sets (D1, P1, and C1) were collected
over a seven-day period from 12/10/2004 to 12/16/2004 and
have been studied in [2] to demonstrate the bursty and spatially
inhomogeneous distribution of malicious source IP addresses.
The last two data sets (W1 and W2) have been used in our
prior work [8] to show the virulence of importance-scanning
malwares. The summary of our data sets is given in Table I.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE DATA SETS.
Trace Description Number of unique source addresses
D1 DShield 7,694,291
P1 Provider 2,355,150
C1 Campus 448,894
W1 Witty-worm victims 55,909
W2 Web servers 13,866
B. Vulnerable-Host Distributions
To obtain vulnerable-host group distributions, we use the
classless inter-domain routing (CIDR) notation [15]. The In-
ternet is partitioned into subnets according to the first l bits
of IP addresses, i.e., /l prefixes or /l subnets. In this division,
there are 2l subnets, and each subnet contains 232−l addresses,
where l ∈ {0, 1, · · · , 32}. For example, when l = 8, the
Internet is grouped into Class A subnets (i.e., /8 subnets); when
l = 16, the Internet is partitioned into Class B subnets (i.e.,
/16 subnets).
We plot the complementary cumulative distribution func-
tions (CCDF) of our collected data sets in /8 and /16 subnets
in Figure 1 in log-log scales. CCDF is defined as the faction
of the subnets with the number of hosts greater than a given
value. Figure 1(a) shows population distributions in /8 subnets
for D1, P1, C1, W1, and W2, whereas Figure 1(b) exhibits
host distributions in /16 subnets for D1 with different ports
(80, 135, 445, 1023, and 6129). Figure 1 demonstrates a
wide range of populations, indicating highly inhomogeneous
address structures. Specifically, the relatively straight lines,
such as W2 and D1-135, imply that vulnerable hosts follow
a power law distribution. Similar observations were given in
[2], [19], [18], [16], [17], [8], [28].
Why is the vulnerable-host distribution highly non-uniform
in the IPv4 address space? An answer to this question would
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Fig. 1. CCDF of collected data sets.
involve other empirical study beyond the scope of this work.
Nevertheless, we hypothesize several possible reasons. First,
no vulnerable hosts can exist in reserved or multicast address
ranges [38]. Second, different subnet administrators make
different use of their own IP address space. Third, a subnet
intends to have many computers with the same operating
systems and applications for easy management [25], [6]. Last,
some subnets are more protected than others [2], [19].
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Motivated by the empirical study, we provide a problem
formulation in this section.
A. Characterization
Let a vulnerable host be a host that can be infected by
a malware. A vulnerable host can be either already infected
or uninfected. In this work, we denote vulnerable hosts as
uninfected vulnerable hosts.
We consider aggregated vulnerable-host distributions. Let
l (0 ≤ l ≤ 32) be an aggregation level of IP addresses as
defined in Section III-B. For a given l, let N (l)i be the number
of vulnerable hosts in /l subnet i, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2l. Let N be
the total number of vulnerable hosts, where N =
∑2l
i=1N
(l)
i .
Let p(l)g (i) (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l) be the probability that a randomly
chosen vulnerable host is in the i-th /l subnet. Then p(l)g (i) =
N
(l)
i
N ; and
∑2l
i=1 p
(l)
g (i) = 1. Thus, p(l)g (i)’s denote the group
distribution of vulnerable hosts in /l subnets.
Now consider a malware or an adversary that searches
for vulnerable hosts. An adversary often does not have the
complete knowledge on the locations of vulnerable hosts.
Hence malwares make a random guess on which /l subnets are
likely to have most vulnerable hosts. This results in a class of
randomized epidemic algorithms for malwares to scan subnets.
Let q(l)g (i) (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l) be the probability that a malware
scans the i-th /l subnet. As we shall see, q(l)g (i)’s characterize
how effectively a malware scans and thus hits vulnerable hosts.
B. Examples
Consider /8 subnets (l = 8). As an extreme case if all
vulnerable hosts are in subnet 123.0.0.0/8, p(8)g (123) = 1
and p(8)g (i) = 0 for i 6= 123. Hence, in view of a network
defender, the network would be extremely vulnerable since if
the malware discovers this subnet, the malware could focus
its scan accordingly and potentially find all vulnerable hosts.
As another extreme case, if p(8)g (i) = 128 is uniform, in view
of a network defender, it would be harder for the malware to
find vulnerable hosts rapidly as they are uniformly distributed
over all /8 subnets.
In view of an adversary, whether and how vulnerable hosts
can be discovered and scanned depends on a randomized
algorithm utilized by the malware. In other words, an ad-
versary can customize q(l)g (i)’s to make the malware spread
either faster or slower. Specifically, for the first extreme
case where all vulnerable subnets are concentrated in subnet
123.0.0.0/8, q
(8)
g (i) = p
(8)
g (i) would be the best choice, and
the resulting malware would spread the fastest. But if the
adversary makes a poor choice of q(l)g (i)’s being uniform
across /8 subnets, the resulting malware spread would be
slow. Hence p(l)g (i)’s and q(l)g (i)’s characterize the severity
of network vulnerabilities and the virulence of randomized
epidemic scanning algorithms, respectively.
C. Problems
We now consider network-aware malware attacks in view
of information theory. If a malware obtains the partial infor-
mation on vulnerable hosts (e.g., p(l)g (i)’s), it can extract the
information (bits) to design randomize epidemic algorithms
(e.g., q(l)g (i)’s). A fundamental question is how we can relate
the information on vulnerable-host distributions with the per-
formance of randomized epidemic algorithms. Specifically, we
intend to study the following questions:
• What information-theoretical measure can be used to
quantify the unevenness of vulnerable-host distributions?
• How much information (bits) on vulnerable hosts can be
extracted by randomized epidemic algorithms utilized by
malwares?
5• How good are practical randomized epidemic algorithms?
• What is the effectiveness of defense methods on network-
aware malwares?
V. NON-UNIFORMITY FACTOR
In this section, we derive a simple metric, called the non-
uniformity factor, to quantify the vulnerability, i.e., the non-
uniformity of a vulnerable-host distribution. We show that the
non-uniformity factor is a function of Renyi entropies. We
then compare the non-uniformity factor with the well-known
Shannon entropy.
A. Definition and Property
Definition: The non-uniformity factor in /l subnets is de-
fined as
β(l) = 2l
2l∑
i=1
(
p(l)g (i)
)2
. (7)
One property of β(l) is that
β(l) ≥

 2
l∑
i=1
p(l)g (i)


2
= 1. (8)
The above inequality is derived by the Cauchy-Schwarz in-
equality. The equality holds if and only if p(l)g (i) = 2−l, for
i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. In other words, when the vulnerable-host
distribution is uniform, β(l) achieves the minimum value 1.
On the other hand, since p(l)g (i) ≥ 0,
β(l) ≤ 2l ·

 2
l∑
i=1
p(l)g (i)


2
= 2l. (9)
The equality holds when p(l)g (j) = 1 for some j and
p
(l)
g (i) = 0, i 6= j, i.e., all vulnerable hosts concentrate on one
subnet. This means that when the vulnerable-host distribution
is extremely non-uniform, β(l) obtains the maximum value 2l.
Moreover, assuming that vulnerable hosts are uniformly dis-
tributed in the first n (1 ≤ n ≤ 2l) /l subnets, i.e., p(l)g (i) = 1n ,
i = 1, 2, · · · , n; and p(l)g (i) = 0, i = n + 1, · · · , 2l, we have
β(l) = 2
l
n . Therefore, β
(l) characterizes the non-uniformity of
a vulnerable-host distribution. A larger non-uniformity factor
reflects a more non-uniform distribution of vulnerable hosts.
The non-uniformity factor is indeed related to a distance
between a vulnerable-host distribution and a uniform distri-
bution. Consider L2 distance between p(l)g (i) and the uniform
distribution p(l)u (i) = 12l for i = 1, 2, · · · , 2
l
, where
||p(l)g − p
(l)
u ||2
2
=
2l∑
i=1
(
p(l)g (i)−
1
2l
)2
, (10)
which leads to
β(l) = 2l · ||p(l)g − p
(l)
u ||2
2
+ 1. (11)
For a given l, 2l is a constant that is the size of the sample
space of /l subnets. Hence β(l) essentially measures the devi-
ation of a vulnerable-host group distribution from a uniform
distribution for /l subnets.
How does β(l) vary with l? When l = 0, β(0) = 1. In the
other extreme where l = 32,
p(32)g (i) =
{
1
N , address i is vulnerable to the malware;
0, otherwise,
(12)
which results in β(32) = 2
32
N . More importantly, the ratio of
β(l) to β(l−1) lies between 1 and 2, as shown below.
Theorem 2:
β(l−1) ≤ β(l) ≤ 2β(l−1), (13)
where l ∈ {1, · · · , 32}.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Appendix 1. An intuitive
explanation of this theorem is as follows. For /l and /(l − 1)
subnets, group i (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l−1) of /(l − 1) subnets
is partitioned into groups 2i − 1 and 2i of /l subnets. If
vulnerable hosts in each group of /(l− 1) subnets are equally
divided into the groups of /l subnets (i.e., p(l)g (2i − 1) =
p
(l)
g (2i) =
1
2p
(l−1)
g (i), ∀i), then β(l) = β(l−1). If the division
of vulnerable hosts is extremely uneven for all groups (i.e.,
p
(l)
g (2i − 1) = 0 or p
(l)
g (2i) = 0, ∀i), then β(l) = 2β(l−1).
Excluding these two extreme cases, β(l−1) < β(l) < 2β(l−1).
Therefore, β(l) is a non-decreasing function of l. Moreover,
the ratio of β(l) to β(l−1) reflects how unevenly vulnerable
hosts in each /(l − 1) subnet distribute between two groups
of /l subnets. This ratio is indicated by the slope of β(l) in a
β(l) ∼ l figure.
B. Estimated Non-Uniformity Factor
Figure 2 shows the non-uniformity factors estimated from
our data sets. The non-uniformity factors increase with the
prefix length for all data sets. Note that the y-axis is in a log
scale. Thus, β(l) increases almost exponentially with a wide
range of l. To gain intuition on how large β(l) can be, β(8)
and β(16) are summarized for all data sets in Table II. It can
be observed that β(8) and β(16) have large values, indicating
the significant unevenness of collected distributions.
TABLE II
β(8) AND β(16) OF COLLECTED DISTRIBUTIONS.
β(l) D1 P1 C1 W1 W2
β(8) 7.9 8.4 9.0 12.0 7.8
β(16) 31.2 43.2 52.2 126.7 50.2
β(l) D1-80 D1-135 D1-445 D1-1023 D1-6129
β(8) 7.9 15.4 10.5 48.2 9.1
β(16) 153.3 186.6 71.7 416.3 128.9
C. Shannon Entropy
To further understand the importance of the non-uniformity
factor, we now turn our attention on the Shannon entropy
for comparison. It is well-known that the Shannon entropy
can be used to measure the non-uniformity of a probability
distribution [11]. The Shannon entropy in /l subnets is defined
as
H
(
P (l)
)
= −
2l∑
i=1
p(l)g (i) log2 p
(l)
g (i), (14)
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Fig. 2. Non-uniformity factors of collected data sets. Note that the y-axis
uses a log scale.
where P (l) = {p(l)g (1), p(l)g (2), · · · , p(l)g (2l)}.
It is noted that
0 ≤ H
(
P (l)
)
≤ l. (15)
If a distribution is uniform, H
(
P (l)
)
achieves the maximum
value l. On the other hand, if a distribution is extremely non-
uniform, e.g., all vulnerable hosts concentrate on one subnet,
H
(
P (l)
)
obtains the minimum value 0.
Furthermore, we compare H
(
P (l)
)
with H
(
P (l−1)
)
and
find that their difference is between 0 and 1, as shown in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3:
H
(
P (l−1)
)
≤ H
(
P (l)
)
≤ H
(
P (l−1)
)
+ 1, (16)
where l ∈ {1, · · · , 32}.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Appendix 2. If
vulnerable hosts in each group of /(l − 1) subnets are ex-
tremely unevenly divided into the groups of /l subnets (i.e.,
p
(l)
g (2i− 1) = 0 or p
(l)
g (2i) = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 2l−1}), then
H
(
P (l)
)
= H
(
P (l−1)
)
. If the division of vulnerable hosts is
equal for all groups (i.e., p(l)g (2i− 1) = p(l)g (2i) = 12p
(l−1)
g (i),
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Fig. 3. Shannon entropies of collected data sets.
∀i)), then H (P (l)) = H (P (l−1)) + 1. Excluding these two
extreme cases, H
(
P (l−1)
)
< H
(
P (l)
)
< H
(
P (l−1)
)
+ 1.
Therefore, H
(
P (l)
)
is a non-decreasing function of l. More-
over, the difference between H
(
P (l)
)
and H
(
P (l−1)
)
reflects
how evenly vulnerable hosts in each /(l− 1) subnet distribute
between two groups of /l subnets.
Figure 3 shows the Shannon entropies of our empirical
distributions from the data sets. H
(
P (l)
)
= l is denoted by
the diagonal line in the figure. It can be seen that the curves
for our collected data sets are similar.
D. Non-Uniformity Factor, Renyi Entropy, and Shannon En-
tropy
To quantify the difference between the non-uniformity fac-
tor and the Shannon entropy, we note that the non-uniformity
factor directly relates to the Renyi entropies of order two and
zero, as shown in the following equation:
β(l) = 2l−H2(P
(l)) = 2H0(P
(l))−H2(P (l)), (17)
where P (l) = {p(l)g (1), p(l)g (2), · · · , p(l)g (2l)}. Therefore, the
non-uniformity factor is essentially a Renyi entropy. Hence,
the non-uniformity factor corresponds to a generalized entropy
7of order 2, whereas the Shannon entropy is the generalized
entropy of order 1.
Why do we choose the non-uniformity factor rather than
the Shannon entropy? We compare these two metrics in terms
of characterizing a vulnerable-host distribution and find the
following fundamental differences.
• In Figure 2, when a distribution is uniform, β(l) = 1.
Hence, the distance between β(l) and the horizontal
access 1 measures the degree of unevenness. Similarly,
the distance between H
(
P (l)
)
and 0 in Figure 3 reflects
how uniform a distribution is. A larger H
(
P (l)
)
cor-
responds to a more even distribution, whereas a larger
β(l) corresponds to a more non-uniform distribution.
In addition, if two distributions have different prefix
lengths, we can directly apply the non-uniformity factor
(or the Shannon entropy) to compare the unevenness (or
evenness) between them. Therefore, the Shanon entropy
provides a better measure for describing the evenness
of a distribution, while the non-uniformity factor gives
a better metric for characterizing the non-uniformity of a
distribution.
• From Theorem 1 and Equation (17), we have β(l) >
2l−H(P
(l)) when the non-zero p(l)g ’s are not all equal.
Meanwhile, evidenced by Figures 2 and 3, the non-
uniformity factor magnifies the unevenness of a distri-
bution. Therefore, β(l) depends more on the large p(l)g ’s.
A more important aspect of using the non-uniformity factor
is its relation to some real randomized epidemic algorithms
(e.g., localized scanning and sequential scanning). Such a
relation cannot be drawn using the Shannon entropy. We will
show this in the next section.
VI. NETWORK-AWARE MALWARE SPREADING ABILITY
In this section, we explicitly relate the speed of malware
propagation with the information bits extracted by random-
scanning and network-aware malwares.
A. Collision Probability, Uncertainty, and Information Bits
We begin with defining three important quantities: the col-
lision probability, uncertainty, and information bits. Consider
a randomly chosen vulnerable host Y . The probability that
this host is in the /l subnet i is p(l)g (i). Imagine that a
malware guesses which subnet host Y belongs to and chooses
a target /l subnet i with the probability q(l)g (i) = p(l)g (i).
Thus, the probability for the malware to make a correct
guess is ph =
∑2l
i=1
(
p
(l)
g (i)
)2
. This probability is called the
collision probability and is defined in [5]. Such a probability
of success is reflected in our designed non-uniformity factor
and corresponds to a scenario that the malware knows the
underlying vulnerable-host group distribution. Intuitively, the
more non-uniform a vulnerable-host distribution is, the larger
the probability of success is, i.e., the easier it is for a scan to
hit a vulnerable host, the more vulnerable the network is, and
the less uncertainty there is in a vulnerable-host distribution.
We now extend the concept of the collision probability and
define ph as the probability that a malware scan hits a subnet
where a randomly chosen vulnerable host locates, i.e.,
ph =
2l∑
i=1
p(l)g (i)q
(l)
g (i). (18)
Then two important quantities can be defined:
• − log2 ph as the uncertainty exhibited by the vulnerable-
host distribution p(l)g (i)’s.
• H0
(
P (l)
)
− [− log2 ph] as the number of information bits
extracted by a randomized epidemic scanning algorithm
using q(l)g (i)’s.
Here − log2 ph is regarded as the uncertainty on the
vulnerable-host distribution in view of the malware, similar
to self-information [39]. For example, if a malware has no
information about a vulnerable-host distribution and has to use
random scanning, it has the largest uncertainty H0
(
P (l)
)
= l
and extracts zero information bit from the distribution. Like-
wise, the number of information bits extracted by a network-
aware malware can be measured as the reduction of the
uncertainty and thus equals to H0
(
P (l)
)
− [− log2 ph]. For
example, log2 β(l) = H0
(
P (l)
)
−H2
(
P (l)
)
is the information
bits extractable by an adversary that chooses q(l)g (i) = p(l)g (i).
B. Infection Rate
We characterize the spread of a network-aware malware at
an early stage by deriving the infection rate. The infection rate,
denoted by α, is defined as the average number of vulnerable
hosts that can be infected per unit time by one infected
host during the early stage of malware propagation [32]. The
infection rate is an important metric for studying network-
aware malware spreading ability for two reasons. First, since
the number of infected hosts increases exponentially with the
rate 1 + α during the early stage, a malware with a higher
infection rate can spread much faster at the beginning and thus
infect a large number of hosts in a shorter time [8]. Second,
while it is generally difficult to derive a close-form solution
for dynamic malware propagation, we can obtain a close-form
expression of the infection rate for different malware scanning
methods.
Let R denote the (random) number of vulnerable hosts that
can be infected per unit time by one infected host during the
early stage of malware propagation. The infection rate is the
expected value of R, i.e., α = E[R]. Let s be the scanning rate
or the number of scans sent by an infected host per unit time,
N be the number of vulnerable hosts, and Ω be the scanning
space (i.e., Ω = 232).
C. Random Scanning
Random scanning (RS) has been used by most real worms.
For RS, an infected host sends out s random scans per unit
time, and the probability that one scan hits a vulnerable host is
N
Ω . Thus, R follows a Binomial distribution B(s, NΩ )1, resulting
in
αRS = E[R] =
sN
Ω
. (19)
1In our derivation, we ignore the dependency of the events that different
scans hit the same target at the early stage of malware propagation.
8Another way to derive the infection rate of RS is as
follows. Consider a randomly chosen vulnerable host Y . The
probability that this host is in the /l subnet i is p(l)g (i). An RS
malware can make a successful guess on which subnet host Y
belongs to with collision probability ph = 12l = 2
−H0(P (l))
.
A scan from the RS malware can be regarded as first selecting
the /l subnet randomly and then choosing the host in the subnet
at random. Hence the probability for the malware to hit host
Y is 1
232−l
· 2−H0(P
(l)) = 2−H0(P
(l))−(32−l)
. Since there are
N vulnerable hosts, the probability for a malware to hit a
vulnerable host is N · 2−H0(P
(l))−(32−l)
. Thus, R follows a
Binomial distribution B(s, N ·2−H0(P (l))−(32−l)), resulting in
αRS = E[R] =
sN
232−l
· 2−H0(P
(l)). (20)
Therefore, for the RS malware, the uncertainty on the
vulnerable-host distribution is − log2 ph = H0
(
P (l)
)
, i.e., the
number of information bits on vulnerable hosts extracted by
RS is H0
(
P (l)
)
−H0
(
P (l)
)
= 0.
D. Optimal Importance Scanning
Importance scanning (IS) exploits the non-uniform distri-
bution of vulnerable hosts. We derive the infection rate of
IS. An infected host scans /l subnet i with the probability
q
(l)
g (i). Consider a randomly chosen vulnerable host Y . The
probability for this host being in /l subnet i is p(l)g (i). An IS
malware can make a successful guess on which subnet host Y
belongs to with collision probability ph =
∑2l
i=1 p
(l)
g (i)q
(l)
g (i).
Thus, the probability for the malware to hit the host Y
is 1232−l
∑2l
i=1 p
(l)
g (i)q
(l)
g (i). Similar to RS, R of IS follows
a Binomial distribution B(s, N
232−l
∑2l
i=1 p
(l)
g (i)q
(l)
g (i)), which
leads to2
αIS = E[R] =
sN
232−l
2l∑
i=1
p(l)g (i)q
(l)
g (i). (21)
Therefore, the uncertainty of the vulnerable-host distribution
for an IS malware is − log2
∑2l
i=1 p
(l)
g (i)q
(l)
g (i), and the num-
ber of information bits on vulnerable hosts extracted by IS is
H0
(
P (l)
)
+ log2
∑2l
i=1 p
(l)
g (i)q
(l)
g (i).
Note that importance scanning can choose q(l)g (i)’s to max-
imize the infection rate, resulting in a “worst-case” scenario
for defenders or /l optimal IS (/l OPT IS) for attackers [8],
i.e.,
α
(l)
OPT IS = max{αIS} =
sN
232−l
max
i
{p(l)g (i)}. (22)
That is,
α
(l)
OPT IS =
sN
232−l
2−H∞(P
(l)) = αRS · 2
H0(P (l))−H∞(P (l)).
(23)
Therefore, the uncertainty on the vulnerable-host distribution
for /l OPT IS is H∞
(
P (l)
)
; and the number of infection
bits on vulnerable hosts extracted by this scanning method
is H0
(
P (l)
)
−H∞
(
P (l)
)
.
2The same result was derived in [8] but by a different approach.
E. Suboptimal Importance Scanning
As shown in our prior work [8], the optimal IS is difficult to
implement in reality. Hence we also consider a special case of
IS, where the group scanning distribution q(l)g (i) is chosen to
be proportional to the number of vulnerable hosts in group i,
i.e., q(l)g (i) = p(l)g (i). This results in suboptimal IS [8], called
/l IS. Thus, the infection rate is
α
(l)
IS =
sN
232−l
2l∑
i=1
(pg(i))
2 =
sN
232−l
·2−H2(P
(l)) = αRS · β
(l).
(24)
Therefore, the uncertainty on the vulnerable-host distribution
for /l IS is H2
(
P (l)
)
; and the corresponding number of infor-
mation bits extracted is H0
(
P (l)
)
− H2
(
P (l)
)
or log2 β
(l)
.
Moreover, compared with RS, this /l IS can increase the
infection rate by a factor of β(l). On the other hand, RS can
be regarded as a special case of suboptimal IS when l = 0.
F. Localized Scanning
Localized scanning (LS) has been used by such real worms
as Code Red II and Nimda. LS is a simpler randomized
algorithm that utilizes only a few parameters rather than
an underlying vulnerable-host group distribution. We first
consider a simplified version of LS, called /l LS, which scans
the Internet as follows:
• pa (0 ≤ pa ≤ 1) of the time, an address with the same
first l bits is chosen as the target,
• 1− pa of the time, an address is chosen randomly from
an entire IP address space.
Hence LS is an oblivious yet local randomized algorithm
where the locality is characterized by parameter pa. Assume
that an initially infected host is randomly chosen from the
vulnerable hosts. Let Ig denote the subnet where an initially
infected host locates. Thus, P (Ig = i) = p(l)g (i), where
i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. For an infected host located in /l subnet i,
a scan from this host probes globally with the probability of
1−pa and hits /l subnet j (j 6= i) with the likelihood of 1−pa2l .
Thus, the group scanning distribution for this host is
q(l)g (j) =
{
pa +
1−pa
2l
, if j = i;
1−pa
2l , otherwise,
(25)
where j = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. Given the subnet location of an ini-
tially infected host (i.e., /l subnet i), the conditional collision
probability or the probability for a malware scan to hit a
randomly chosen vulnerable host can be calculated based on
Equation (18), i.e.,
ph(i) = pap
(l)
g (i) +
1− pa
2l
. (26)
Therefore, we can compute the collision probability as
ph =
2l∑
i=1
P (Ig = i)ph(i) = pa
2l∑
i=1
p2g(i) +
1− pa
2l
, (27)
resulting in
α
(l)
LS = αRS
(
1− pa + paβ
(l)
)
. (28)
9Therefore, the number of information bits extracted from the
vulnerable-host distribution by /l LS is log2{1−pa+paβ(l)},
which is between 0 and H0
(
P (l)
)
−H2
(
P (l)
)
.
Moreover, since β(l) > 1 (β(l) = 1 is for a uniform
distribution and is excluded here), α(l)LS increases with respect
to pa. Specifically, when pa → 1, α(l)LS → αRSβ(l) = α
(l)
IS .
Thus, /l LS has an infection rate comparable to that of /l IS.
In reality, pa cannot be 1. This is because an LS malware
begins spreading from one infected host that is specifically in
a subnet; and if pa = 1, the malware can never spread out of
this subnet. Therefore, we expect that the optimal value of pa
should be large but not 1.
Next, we further consider another LS, called two-level LS
(2LLS), which has been used by the Code Red II and Nimda
worms [34], [35]. 2LLS scans the Internet as follows:
• pb (0 ≤ pb ≤ 1) of the time, an address with the same
first byte is chosen as the target,
• pc (0 ≤ pc ≤ 1 − pb) of the time, an address with the
same first two bytes is chosen as the target,
• 1− pb − pc of the time, a random address is chosen.
For example, for the Code Red II worm, pb = 0.5 and pc =
0.375 [34]; for the Nimda worm, pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5
[35]. Using the similar analysis for /l LS, we can derive the
infection rate of 2LLS:
α2LLS = αRS
(
1− pb − pc + pbβ
(8) + pcβ
(16)
)
. (29)
Similarly, the number of information bits extracted from
the vulnerable-host distribution by the 2LLS malware is
log2{1 − pb − pc + pbβ
(8) + pcβ
(16)}, which is between 0
and H0
(
P (16)
)
−H2
(
P (16)
)
.
Since β(16) ≥ β(8) ≥ 1 from Theorem 2, α2LLS holds
or increases when both pb and pc increase. Specially, when
pc → 1, α2LLS → αRSβ
(16) = α
(16)
IS . Thus, 2LLS has an
infection rate comparable to that of /16 IS. Moreover, β(16) is
much larger than β(8) as shown in Table II for the collected
distributions. Hence, pc is more significant than pb for 2LLS.
G. Modified Sequential Scanning
The Blaster worm is a real malware that exploits se-
quential scanning in combination with localized scanning. A
sequential-scanning malware studied in [33], [13] begins to
scan addresses sequentially from a randomly chosen starting
IP address and has a similar propagation speed as a random-
scanning malware. The Blaster worm selects its starting point
locally as the first address of its Class C subnet with probabil-
ity 0.4 [37], [33]. To analyze the effect of sequential scanning,
we do not incorporate localized scanning. Specifically, we
consider our /l modified sequential-scanning (MSS) malware,
which scans the Internet as follows:
• Newly infected host A begins with random scanning until
finding a vulnerable host with address B.
• After infecting the target B, host A continues to sequen-
tially scan IP addresses B + 1, B + 2, · · · (or B − 1,
B − 2, · · · ) in the /l subnet where B locates.
Such a sequential malware-scanning strategy is in a similar
spirit to the nearest neighbor rule, which is widely used
in pattern classification [10]. The basic idea is that if the
vulnerable hosts are clustered, the neighbor of a vulnerable
host is likely to be vulnerable also.
Such a /l MSS malware has two stages. In the first stage
(called MSS 1), the malware uses random scanning and has
an infection rate of αRS , i.e., αMSS 1 = αRS . In the second
stage (called MSS 2), the malware scans sequentially in a /l
subnet. The fist l bits of a target address are fixed, whereas
the last 32− l bits of the address are generated additively or
subtractively and are modulated by 232−l. Let Ig denote the
sunbet where B locates. Thus, P (Ig = i) = p(l)g (i), where
i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l. Since an MSS 2 malware scans only the
subnet where B locates, the conditional collision probability
ph(i) = p
(l)
g (i), which leads to ph =
∑2l
i=1
(
p
(l)
g (i)
)2
. Thus,
the infection rate is
αMSS 2 = αRS · β
(l). (30)
Therefore, the uncertainty on vulnerable hosts for /l MSS is
between H0
(
P (l)
)
and H2
(
P (l)
)
. Moreover, the infection rate
of /l MSS is between αRS and αRSβ(l).
H. Summary
In summary, the uncertainty on the vulnerable-host dis-
tribution and the corresponding number of information bits
extracted by different randomized epidemic algorithms de-
pends on the Renyi entropies of different orders, as shown
in Table III. Moreover, the number of the information bits
extractable by the network-aware malwares bridges the entropy
on a vulnerable-host distribution and the malware propagation
speed, as shown in the following equation.
Information bits = H0
(
P (l)
)
− [− log2 ph] = log2
{
α
αRS
}
,
(31)
where ph is the collision probability and α is the infection rate
of the malware.
When /l subnets are considered, RS has the largest uncer-
tainty H0
(
P (l)
)
, while optimal IS has the smallest uncertainty
H∞
(
P (l)
)
. Moreover, infection rates of all three network-
aware malwares (suboptimal IS, LS, and MSS) can be far
larger than that of an RS malware, depending on the non-
uniformity factors (i.e., β(l)) or the Renyi entropy in the
order of two (i.e., H2
(
P (l)
)). The infection rates of all these
scanning algorithms are characterized by the Renyi entropies,
relating the efficiency of a randomized scanning algorithm
with the information bits in a non-uniform vulnerable-host
distribution.
Hence we relate the information theory with the network-
aware malware propagation through the Renyi entropy. The
uncertainty of a vulnerable-host group probability distribution,
which is quantified by the Renyi entropy, is important for an
attacker to design a network-aware malware. If there is no
uncertainty about the distribution of vulnerable hosts (e.g.,
either all vulnerable hosts are concentrated on a subnet or
all information about vulnerable hosts is known), the entropy
is minimum, and the malware that uses the information on
the distribution can spread fastest by employing the optimal
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF RANDOMIZED EPIDEMIC SCANNING ALGORITHMS AND INFORMATION BITS
Algorithm Infection Rate Information Bits Extracted
RS sN
232−l
· 2
−H0
(
P
(l)
)
0
/l OPT IS αRS · 2
H0
(
P
(l)
)
−H∞
(
P
(l)
)
H0
(
P (l)
)
−H∞
(
P (l)
)
/l IS αRS · β(l) log2{β(l)}
/l LS αRS
(
1− pa + paβ(l)
)
log2{1 − pa + paβ
(l)}
2LLS αRS
(
1− pb − pc + pbβ
(8) + pcβ
(16)
)
log2{1− pb − pc + pbβ
(8) + pcβ
(16)}
/l MSS 2 αRS · β(l) log2{β(l)}
importance scanning. On the other hand, if there is maximum
uncertainty (e.g., vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed),
the entropy is maximum. For this case, the best a malware
can take an advantage from a uniform distribution is to use
random scanning. In general, when an attacker obtains more
information about a non-uniform vulnerable-host distribution,
the resulting malware can spread faster.
VII. SIMULATION AND VALIDATION
We now validate our analytical results through simulations
on the collected data sets.
A. Infection Rate
We first focus on validating infection rates. We apply the
discrete event simulation to our experiments [23]. Specifically,
we simulate the searching process of a malware using different
scanning methods at the early stage. We use the C1 data set for
the vulnerable-host distribution. Note that the C1 distribution
has the non-uniformity factors β(8) = 9.0 and β(16) = 52.2,
and maxi{p(l)g (i)} = 0.0041. The malware spreads over the
C1 distribution with N = 448, 894 and has a scanning rate
s = 100. The uncertainty on the vulnerable-host distribution
and the information bits extractable for different scanning
methods are shown in Table IV. The simulation stops when
the malware has sent out 103 scans for RS, /16 OPT IS, /16
IS, /16 LS, and 2LLS, and 65,535 scans for /16 MSS 2. Then,
we count the number of vulnerable hosts hit by the malware
scans and compute the infection rate. The results are averaged
over 104 runs. Table IV compares the simulation results (i.e.,
sample mean) with the analytical results (i.e., Equations (20),
(22), (24), (28), (29), and (30)). Here, a /16 LS malware uses
pa = 0.75, whereas a 2LLS malware employs pb = 0.25 and
pc = 0.5. We observe that the sample means and the analytical
results are almost identical.
We observe that network-aware malwares have much larger
infection rates than random-scanning malwares. LS indeed
increases the infection rate with nearly a non-uniformity
factor and approaches the capacity of suboptimal IS. This
is significant as LS only depends on one or two parameters
(i.e., pa for /l LS and pb, pc for 2LLS), while IS requires the
information of the vulnerable-host distribution. On the other
hand, LS has a larger sample variance than IS as indicated
by Table IV. This implies that the infection speed of an LS
malware depends on the location of initially infected hosts.
If the LS malware begins spreading from a subnet containing
densely populated vulnerable hosts, the malware would spread
rapidly. Furthermore, we notice that the MSS malware also has
a large infection rate at the second stage, indicating that MSS
can indeed exploit the clustering pattern of the distribution.
Meanwhile, the large sample variance of the infection rate of
MSS 2 reflects that an MSS malware strongly depends on the
initially infected hosts. We further compute the infection rate
of a /16 MSS malware that includes both random-scanning and
sequential-scanning stages. Simulation results are averaged
over 106 runs and are summarized in Table V. These results
strongly depend on the total number of malware scans. When
the number of malware scans is small, an MSS malware
behaves similar to a random-scanning malware. When the
number of malware scans increases, the MSS malware spends
more scans on the second stage and thus has a larger infection
rate.
TABLE V
INFECTION RATES OF A /16 MSS MALWARE.
# of malware scans 10 100 1000 10000 50000
Sample mean 0.0108 0.0190 0.0728 0.2866 0.4298
Sample variance 0.1246 0.1346 0.1659 0.2498 0.2311
B. Dynamic Malware Propagation
An infection rate only characterizes the early stage of mal-
ware propagation. We now employ the analytical active worm
propagation (AAWP) model and its extensions to characterize
the entire spreading process of malwares [6]. Specifically, the
spread of RS and IS malwares is implemented as described
in [8], whereas the propagation of LS malwares is modeled
according to [19]. The parameters that we use to simulate a
malware are comparable to those of the Code Red v2 worm.
Code Red v2 has a vulnerable population N = 360, 000 and
a scanning rate s = 358 per minute [31]. We assume that
the malware begins spreading from an initially infected host
that is located in the subnet containing the largest number of
vulnerable hosts.
We first show the propagation speeds of network-aware
malwares for the same vulnerable-host distribution from data
set D1-80. From Section VI, we expect that a network-aware
malware can spread much faster than an RS malware. Figure 4
demonstrates such an example on a malware that uses different
scanning methods. It takes an RS malware 10 hours to infect
99% of vulnerable hosts, whereas a /8 LS malware with
pa = 0.75 or a /8 IS malware takes only about 3.5 hours.
A /16 LS malware with pa = 0.75 or a 2LLS malware with
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TABLE IV
UNCERTAINTY ON THE VULNERABLE-HOST DISTRIBUTION, INFORMATION BITS, AND INFECTION RATES OF DIFFERENT SCANNING METHODS.
Scanning method RS /16 OPT IS /16 IS /16 LS 2LLS /16 MSS 2
Uncertainty (analytical result) 16 7.9266 10.2940 10.6999 11.1620 10.2940
Information bits (analytical result) 0 8.0734 5.7060 5.3001 4.8380 5.7060
Infection rate (analytical result) 0.0105 2.8152 0.5456 0.4118 0.2989 0.5456
Infection rate (sample mean) 0.0103 2.7745 0.5454 0.4023 0.2942 0.5489
Infection rate (sample variance) 0.0010 0.2597 0.0543 0.2072 0.1053 0.3186
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Fig. 4. A network-aware malware spreads over the D1-80 distribution.
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Fig. 5. A 2LLS malware spreads over different distributions.
pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5 can further reduce the time to 1 hour.
A /16 IS malware spreads fastest and takes only 0.5 hour.
We also study the effect of vulnerable-host distributions on
the propagation of network-aware malwares. From Table II,
we observe that β(16)D1−1023 > β
(16)
W1 > β
(16)
C1 > β
(16)
D1 . Thus,
we expect that a network-aware malware using the /16 D1-
1023 distribution would spread faster than using other three
distributions. Figure 5 verifies this through the simulations of
the spread of a 2LLS malware that uses different vulnerable-
host distributions (i.e., D1-1023, W1, C1, and D1). Here, the
2LLS malware employs the same parameters as the Nimda
worm, i.e., pb = 0.25 and pc = 0.5. As expected, the malware
using the D1-1023 distribution spreads fastest, especially at
the early stage of malware propagation.
VIII. EFFECTIVENESS OF DEFENSE STRATEGIES
What are new requirements and challenges for a defense
system to slow down the spread of a network-aware malware?
We study the effectiveness of defense strategies through non-
uniformity factors.
A. Host-Based Defense
Host-based defense has been widely used for random-
scanning malwares. Proactive protection and virus throttling
are examples of host-based defense strategies.
A proactive protection (PP) strategy proactively hardens a
system, making it difficult for a malware to exploit vulnera-
bilities [4]. Techniques used by PP include address-space ran-
domization, pointer encryption, instruction-set randomization,
and password protection. Thus, a malware requires multiple
trials to compromise a host that implements PP. Specifically,
let p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) denote the protection probability or the
probability that a single malware attempt succeeds in infecting
a vulnerable host that implements PP. On the average, a
malware should make 1p exploit attempts to compromise the
target. We assume that hosts with PP are uniformly deployed
in the Internet. Let d (0 < d ≤ 1) denote the deployment ratio
of the number of hosts with PP to the total number of hosts.
To show the effectiveness of the PP strategy, we consider
the infection rate of a /l IS malware. Since now some of the
vulnerable hosts implement PP, Equation (24) changes to
α
(l)
IS =
sN
232−l
2l∑
i=1
[
dp
(
p(l)g (i)
)2
+ (1− d)
(
p(l)g (i)
)2]
= αRSβ
(l)(1− d+ dp). (32)
To slow down the spread of a suboptimal IS malware to that
of a random-scanning malware, β(l)(1−d+dp) ≤ 1, resulting
in
p ≤
1− (1 − d)β(l)
dβ(l)
. (33)
When PP is fully deployed, i.e., d = 1, p can be at most
1
β(l)
. On the other hand, if PP provides perfect protection, i.e.,
p = 0, d should be at least 1 − 1
β(l)
. Therefore, when β(l) is
large, Inequality (33) presents high requirements for the PP
strategy. For example, if β(16) = 50 (most of β(16)’s in Table
II are larger than this value), p ≤ 0.02 and d ≥ 0.98. That is,
a PP strategy should be almost fully deployed and provide a
nearly perfect protection for a vulnerable host.
We extend the model described in [8] to characterize the
spread of suboptimal IS malwares under the defense of the PP
strategy and show the results in Figure 6. Here, Code-Red-v2-
like malwares spread over the C1 distribution with β(16) =
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Fig. 6. A /16 IS malware spreads under the defense of PP.
52.2. It is observed that even when the protection probability
is small (e.g., p = 0.01) and the deployment ratio is high
(e.g., d = 0.8), a /16 IS malware is slowed down a little at the
early stage, compared with a /16 IS malware without the PP
defense (i.e., p = 1 and d = 0). Moreover, when p is small
(e.g., p ≤ 0.02), d is a more sensitive parameter than p.
We next consider the virus throttling (VT) strategy [27]. VT
constrains the number of outgoing connections of a host and
can thus reduce the scanning rate of an infected host. We find
that Equation (32) also holds for this strategy, except that p is
the ratio of the scanning rate of infected hosts with VT to that
of infected hosts without VT. Therefore, VT also requires to
be almost fully deployed for fighting network-aware malwares
effectively.
From these two strategies, we have learned that an effective
strategy should reduce either αRS or β(l). Host-based defense,
however, is limited in such capabilities.
B. IPv6
IPv6 can decrease αRS significantly by increasing the
scanning space [32]. But the non-uniformity factor would
increase the infection rate if the vulnerable-host distribution
is still non-uniform. Hence, an important question is whether
IPv6 can counteract network-aware malwares when both αRS
and β(l) are taken into consideration.
We study this issue by computing the infection rate of a
network-aware malware in the IPv6 Internet. As pointed out by
[3], a smart malware can first detect some vulnerable hosts in
/64 subnets containing many vulnerable hosts, then release to
the hosts on the hitlist, and finally spread inside these subnets.
Such a malware only scans the local /64 subnet. Thus, we
focus on the spreading speed of a network-aware malware
in a /64 subnet. From Figure 2, we extrapolate that β(32) in
the IPv6 Internet can be in the order of 105 if hosts are still
distributed in a clustered fashion. Using the parameters N =
108 proposed by [12] and s = 4, 000 used by the Slammer
worm [17], we derive the infection rate of a /32 IS malware in
a /64 subnet of the IPv6 Internet: αIPv6IS = sN264 ·β
(32) = 2.2×
10−3. αIPv6IS is larger than the infection rate of the Code Red
v2 worm in the IPv4 Internet, where αCRRS =
360,000×358/60
232 =
5× 10−4.
Therefore, IPv6 can only slow down the spread of a
network-aware malware to that of a random-scanning malware
in IPv4. To defend against the malware effectively, we should
further consider how to slow down the increase rate of β(l) as l
increases when IPv4 is updated to IPv6. In essence, we should
reduce the information bits extractable by the network-aware
malwares from the vulnerable-host distribution.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have first obtained and characterized
empirical vulnerable-host distributions, using five large mea-
surement sets from different sources. We have derived a simple
metric, known as the non-uniformity factor, to quantify an
uneven distribution of vulnerable hosts. The non-uniformity
factors have been obtained on the empirical vulnerable-host
distributions using our collected data, and all of which demon-
strate large values. This implies that the non-uniformity of
the vulnerable-host distribution is significant and seems to
be consistent across networks and applications. Moreover,
the non-uniformity factor, shown as a function of the Renyi
entropies of order two and zero, better characterizes the uneven
feature of a distribution than the Shannon entropy.
We have drawn a relationship between Renyi entropies
and randomized epidemic scanning algorithms. In particular,
we have quantified the spreading ability of network-aware
malwares that utilize randomized scanning algorithms at the
early stage. These randomized malware-scanning algorithms
range from optimal randomized scanning (e.g., importance
scanning) to real malware scanning (e.g., localized scanning).
We have derived analytical expressions relating the infection
rates of network-aware malwares with the uncertainty (i.e.,
Renyi entropy) of finding vulnerable hosts. We have derived
and empirically verified that localized scanning and modified
sequential scanning can increase the infection rate by nearly
a non-uniformity factor when compared to random scanning
and thus approach the capacity of suboptimal importance
scanning. As a result, we have bridged the information bits
extracted by malwares from a vulnerable-host distribution with
the propagation speed of network-aware malwares.
Furthermore, we have evaluated the effectiveness of several
commonly used defense strategies on network-aware mal-
wares. The host-based defense, such as proactive protection
or virus throttling, requires to be almost fully deployed to
slow down malware spreading at the early stage. This implies
that host-based defense would be weakened significantly by
network-aware scanning. More surprisingly, different from
previous findings, we have shown that network-aware mal-
wares can be zero-day malwares in the IPv6 Internet if
vulnerable hosts are still clustered. These findings present a
significant challenge to malware defense: Entirely different
strategies may be needed for fighting against network-aware
malwares.
The information-theoretical view of malware attacks pro-
vides us a quantification and a better understanding of three
aspects: a non-uniform vulnerable-host distribution character-
ized by the non-uniformity factor or the Renyi entropy of order
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two, randomized malware-scanning algorithms characterized
by the infection rate or the Renyi entropy of different orders,
and the effectiveness of defense strategies.
As part of our ongoing work, we plan to study in more
depth relationships between information theory and dynamic
malware attacks for developing effective detection and defense
systems that would take vulnerable-host distributions into
consideration.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
PROOF: Group i (i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l−1) of /(l − 1) subnets is
partitioned into groups 2i− 1 and 2i of /l subnets. Thus,
p(l−1)g (i) = p
(l)
g (2i− 1) + p
(l)
g (2i), (A-1)
where i = 1, 2, · · · , 2i−1. Then, β(l) is related to β(l−1) by
the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
β(l) = 2l−1
2l−1∑
i=1



 2∑
j=1
12



 2∑
j=1
(
p(l)g (2(i − 1) + j)
)2


≥ 2l−1
2l−1∑
i=1

 2∑
j=1
p(l)g (2(i− 1) + j)


2
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= β(l−1). (A-2)
The equality holds when p(l)g (2i − 1) = p(l)g (2i) =
p(l−1)g (i)
2 ,
i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l−1. That is, in each /(l − 1) subnet, the
vulnerable hosts are uniformly distributed in two groups of
/l subnets.
On the other hand, since
(
p(l)g (2i− 1)
)2
+
(
p(l)g (2i)
)2
≤
(
p(l)g (2i− 1) + p
(l)
g (2i)
)2
,
(A-3)
we have
β(l)
β(l−1)
= 2 ·
∑2l−1
i=1
[(
p
(l)
g (2i− 1)
)2
+
(
p
(l)
g (2i)
)2]
∑2l−1
i=1
(
p
(l−1)
g (i)
)2
≤ 2. (A-4)
The equality holds when for ∀i, p(l)g (2i−1) = 0 or p(l)g (2i) =
0. That is, in each /(l − 1) subnet, the vulnerable hosts
are extremely non-uniformly distributed in two groups of /l
subnets.
APPENDIX 2: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
PROOF: Since
p(l−1)g (i) =
2∑
j=1
p(l)g (2(i − 1) + j) ≥ p
(l)
g (2(i−1)+j), (A-5)
where i = 1, 2, · · · , 2l−1, we have
H
(
P (l)
)
= −
2l−1∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
p(l)g (2(i− 1) + j) log2 p
(l)
g (2(i− 1) + j)
≥ −
2l−1∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
p(l)g (2(i− 1) + j) log2 p
(l−1)
g (i)
= H
(
P (l−1)
)
. (A-6)
The equality holds when for ∀i, p(l)g (2i−1) = 0 or p(l)g (2i) =
0. That is, in each /(l − 1) subnet, the vulnerable hosts
are extremely non-uniformly distributed in two groups of /l
subnets.
On the other hand, using the log-sum inequality,
2∑
j=1
p(l)g (2(i− 1) + j) log2 p
(l)
g (2(i− 1) + j)
≥

 2∑
j=1
p(l)g (2(i− 1) + j)

 log2
∑2
j=1 p
(l)
g (2(i− 1) + j)
2
,
(A-7)
we have
H
(
P (l)
)
= −
2l−1∑
i=1
2∑
j=1
p(l)g (2(i− 1) + j) log2 p
(l)
g (2(i− 1) + j)
≤ −
2l−1∑
i=1
(
p(l−1)g (i)
)
log2
p
(l−1)
g (i)
2
= H
(
P (l−1)
)
+ 1. (A-8)
The equality holds when for ∀i, p(l)g (2i − 1) = p(l)g (2i) =
p(l−1)g (i)
2 . That is, in each /(l− 1) subnet, the vulnerable hosts
are uniformly distributed in two groups of /l subnets.
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